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in light of coloniality (not just colonization), as central to 
philosophical practice. The previous, however, are topics 
and concerns of great importance in other branches of 
philosophy and even in other disciplines. Thus, as Jorge J. E. 
Gracia explains below (in so many words), I am perhaps only 
capable of painting a picture of Latin American philosophy 
as “philosophy born of [colonial] struggle,” to slightly tweak 
the phrase coined by the African American philosopher 
Leonard Harris.4 This limitation is not a problem; I have 
no problem viewing Latin American philosophy as part of 
a larger philosophical practice committed to struggling 
against coloniality in its various manifestations. I think this 
imbues Latin American philosophy with a proclivity towards 
praxis that is missing in most of academic philosophy. In 
addition, I think there is an important difference between 
philosophizing from freedom and philosophizing for the 
sake of freedom. Philosophy looks different and often 
assumes “non-canonical,” “non-philosophical,” or “non-
traditional” purposes and problematics in political and 
socio-economic contexts plagued by ongoing structures of 
oppression, especially those resulting from coloniality.
For the most part, philosophers residing in imperial, 
developed countries are typically free (or at least free 
enough) to think without the constraints or burdens of their 
particular social, cultural, racial, and gendered existence. 
These individuals tend to think “universally” and their 
subjectivity or identity rarely enters the philosophical 
purview, except for discussions of identity writ large (in 
the sense that J. Locke talks about personal identity). This 
is especially true when the face of philosophy reflects 
the dominant racial, gender, class, and/or sexual norm, 
or when one’s status in country or place of residence is 
authorized by the state; that is, when one’s subjectivity is 
legally, metaphysically, and socio-historically secure. To 
philosophize from this perspective does not mean that 
one is totally free of conflict or strife, for nobody lives a 
life free of turmoil of some kind. Nevertheless, there exist 
ways of practicing philosophy that begin from socially 
advantageous positions that subsequently delimit the 
philosophical practice. 
For those in colonial (and even “post-colonial”) circumstances 
that find themselves on the side of underdevelopment, 
poverty, marginality, and domination, this luxury is not so 
apparent.5 For those that think for the sake of freedom the 
exigencies of their circumstances force a critical reflective 
stance that targets oppression, structural inequalities, 
pain, and suffering. Since “privileged” philosophers think 
from perspectives where their interests and problems 
are recognized and align with traditional or historical 
philosophical problematics, their status as philosophers 
is never in question. Those philosophers who begin from 
contested, dominated, and oppressed social locales are said 
to think about “non-philosophical” issues, their discourses 
remain unauthorized and non-canonical for reasons that 
reflect nothing other than bias, blatant disregard, and the 
force of history.6 These are the non-philosophers, the ones 
that use philosophy for instrumental reasons, and in so 
doing jeopardize their stance in academic and intellectual 
circles—this where I place Latin American philosophy.
16. I got the idea for this distinction in a conversation with Bernard 
Kobes, who pointed me to John Searle’s distinction between 
regulative rules and constitutive rules in Speech Acts (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1969), 33. The distinction is this: 
“regulative rules regulate antecedently or independently 
existing forms of behaviour; for example, many rules of etiquette 
regulate inter-personal relationships which exist independently 
of the rules. But constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they 
create or define new forms of behaviour. The rules of football or 
chess, for example, do not merely regulate playing football or 
chess, but as it were they create the very possibility of playing 
such games.”
17. Most philosophers, under the influence of liberal individualism 
perhaps, would reject this view on the grounds that there is 
not a proper way to be a Latino/a and also no proper way to be 
a Latino/a philosopher. After all, to claim that there are moral 
obligations in virtue of one’s (unchosen) race or ethnicity, they 
would say, is to essentialize the very same, which is descriptively 
mistaken insofar as races are not real, and it might be thought 
to be morally impermissible insofar as it denies the “priority 
of individual liberty,” or imposes unwanted obligations on 
individuals without their consent. I am of the mind that this line 
of argument is mistaken in regard to racialized and oppressed/
marginalized groups. Someone wanting to make the case would 
want, however, to distinguish between the in-fact rules which 
our social reality collectively sustains, some of which may be 
pernicious (e.g., Jim Crow-era rules of conduct), and those that 
would be appropriate rules for people of color to adopt in order 
to combat oppression. In a future work, I would like to expand on 
this theme, but here I set this issue aside.
18. This, of course, is not to say that we cannot criticize our 
philosophical forbears. It is just to point to the social meaning 
attached to the disavowal and dismissal of LALo/a philosophy by 
other philosophers, and particularly by Latino/a philosophers.
Why the Struggle Against Coloniality Is 
Paramount to Latin American Philosophy
Grant J. Silva
MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY
As a Latino philosopher who teaches and specializes in Latin 
American philosophy, I am often frustrated by explanations 
of this subfield that describe it as “philosophy, just south 
of the United States border” or “any kind of philosophy 
done in Latin America.”1 Other ways of putting this suggest 
that Latin American philosophy is an area of thought 
concerned with the history of philosophy in Latin America 
as opposed to the possibility of a distinctive Latin American 
philosophy, the former often a report on easily recognizable 
sub-disciplines—such as Marxism, phenomenology, 
philosophical anthropology, analytic philosophy, axiology, 
philosophy of law—as they have taken place in Latin 
America (including Brazil), the Caribbean, and even 
amongst Latino/as in the United States.2 Although meant to 
be inclusive (perhaps too inclusive), the above descriptions 
are vague and mislead those unfamiliar with the field. They 
eclipse a “tradition,” for lack of a better word, that takes the 
idea of Latin America and all the identity crises that come 
with this regional affiliation as the point of departure for 
philosophical analysis and practice.3
This tradition places much importance on the goal of 
liberation, the idea of freedom (an idea realized in various 
ways), the significance and unavoidability of “place” or 
one’s circumstance, and the need for creativity and/or 
“openness,” especially in terms of how one thinks and lives 
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There is much to appreciate in Gracia’s comments, 
particularly his anti-essentialism and turn to a familial-
historical model for understanding group identities 
(Gracia’s modus operandi10). Both are worthwhile 
contributions to philosophy of race and ethnicity, and, as 
I will suggest, epitomize a Latin American philosophical 
concern with freedom from totalizing concepts, the type of 
which are typified by colonial impositions. Gracia assumes 
that like ethnic groups themselves, it is wrong to think 
of “ethnic philosophies” in essentialized ways that rely 
upon necessary and sufficient conditions. There is no one 
definitive characteristic or trait that defines the members 
of an ethnic group. Instead, ethnic groups are cluster 
concepts, groupings united on their relation to a variety 
of traits to characteristics, none of which are necessary 
and often context-specific. Ethnic philosophies supervene 
on ethnic groups, and the fact that members of an ethnic 
group do not share in a single feature entails that a 
philosophy arising from this group cannot harbor universal 
characteristics. Gracia holds that “ethnic philosophies 
are historical realities enmeshed in webs of complicated 
relations.” He continues, “a proper understanding of them 
must reflect this reality [. . .] the conditions of membership 
vary, as history itself does, allowing for different groupings 
and ways of looking at them.”11
There are two dimensions of Gracia’s views that are worth 
focusing on. One pertains to the idea of history itself; 
the other to how history is interpreted. There are various 
ways of explaining what history is: (1) facts or events 
that have taken place; (2) interpretation or accounts of 
facts as performed by historians; and (3) “history” as a 
discipline, which entails an assortment of meta-historical 
and methodological principles and commitments.12 This 
variegated understanding of history results in no exclusive 
way of looking at the past or even agreement upon what 
constitutes “history.” One’s interests, goals, proximity, or 
distance to the subject in question condition how they 
view the past. To impose a single monolithic interpretation 
of the past frustrates other ways of viewing history and, 
more importantly, preempts the formulation of novel 
perspectives. For ethnic philosophies like Latin American 
philosophy, such imperial approaches to its history limit 
the range of possible interpretations (and manifestations) 
in the present and future. As I take it, Gracia’s views are not 
just about the multiplicity that is the past, but also about 
the dynamic and creative nature of the present determined 
by that “past” and the possibility for an open future. To 
say that all members of an ethnic philosophy necessarily 
share in one common feature is to totalize or master the 
practice and boundaries of that philosophy. This means 
the concepts that arise from this group will be limited by 
the conditions that are imposed by an over-determined 
historical view. This would be the colonization of a particular 
ethnic philosophy.13
My “liberationist” reading of Gracia’s work is supported 
by his views on ethnic groupings. While discussing the 
problems that arise when one expects all Latino/as to speak 
Spanish or eat beans and rice or dance salsa, namely, the 
problems with stereotypes, he writes:
While the above dichotomy admits of problems on multiple 
levels, it nonetheless presents opportunity to examine the 
difference offered by Latin American and other ways of 
doing philosophy. Whatever Latin American philosophy 
(LAP) may be, philosophy at the service of freedom plays 
a crucial role in the tradition I am concerned with, one 
that cannot be subsumed into a retelling of the history 
of Western thought as it has taken place south of the U.S. 
border. More than just the history of philosophy in the 
region, Latin American philosophy is an example of what 
philosophy looks like in the face of coloniality.7
What follows contains a weak claim and a strong claim 
(perhaps a better way of describing these is to say 
descriptive and normative). The weaker claim is that one can 
interpret or describe the works of various Latin American 
philosophers as concerned with freedom, liberty, and the 
problem of colonization or coloniality, even when this is 
not the explicit goal of the author. More often than not, no 
interpretation is needed. Whether it is national liberation 
or questions of mestizaje; epistemic or political justice 
for indigenous peoples; freedom from political, racial, 
or gender oppression imposed by a patriarchal/colonial 
order; the importance of authenticity or originality in light 
of colonialism; or even anti-essentialist understandings 
of Latino/a identity, a majority of what constitutes Latin 
American philosophy revolves around, has been impacted 
by and concerned with, coloniality and liberation. This is not 
to suggest that every page of Latin American philosophy 
contains the words “colonial,” “coloniality,” “liberation,” 
or derivatives of these terms. Nevertheless, I believe that 
one is hard pressed to find “pure” philosophical content 
in Latin America that is not in some way engendered by 
or valued for its contribution to Latin American societies 
or cultures. This imbues Latin American philosophy with 
a tendency towards political thought, such that the term 
“Latin American political philosophy” is a pleonasm at best 
and a tautology at worst.
So as to take the more difficult route, I offer Gracia’s thoughts 
on why coloniality or colonization cannot be the basis for 
LAP as an example of an implicit instance where liberation-
themes nonetheless abound. In his essay, “Ethnic Labels 
and Philosophy,” Gracia argues that what is distinctive 
about Latin American philosophy, or that which unites Latin 
American thinkers under the umbrella of “Latin American 
philosophy,” cannot be “the experience of so-called 
coloniality, or even perhaps marginality.”8 Colonization 
cannot serve as the basis for Latin American philosophy 
since not all experiences of colonialism are uniform nor is 
colonization unique to Latin American history. Coloniality 
as the basis for Latin American philosophy establishes 
conditions that are either too strict, such that it leaves 
out some of the region’s best thinkers who never wrote 
a word about colonization, or this criterion establishes 
conditions that are satisfied by many non-Latin Americans, 
e.g., Africans, Asians, and perhaps even North Americans. 
At best, Gracia continues, “even if one were to accept that 
coloniality is in fact something that characterizes Latin 
American philosophy, this would help to separate it only 
from philosophy which is a product of the First World, not 
from the philosophy of other parts of the world that have 
also suffered colonial exploitation.”9
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of America, as Gracia does, and a range of topics that 
tend to be discussed by various thinkers that fall within 
this area of study, these are historically contingent and 
always contextualized. Thus, what is called “Latin American 
philosophy” is not meaningless, as this title signifies a 
set of questions that are clumped together for a variety 
of reasons, none of which should reign supreme. Thus, to 
say that Latin American philosophy maintains an inherent 
tendency towards liberatory thought is simply to highlight 
a contingent history that makes sense in light of a desire 
to differentiate Latin American philosophy from those 
descriptions of this field posed at the onset of this essay 
(for the reasons offered above in addition to those that 
come below).
I ask, if the burden of differentiating Latin American 
philosophy from Anglophonic interpretations of the 
philosophical canon falls upon the texts and ideas that 
do not just retell the history of Western philosophy south 
of the U.S. border but represent a particular way of doing 
philosophy that is unique to “Latin America” and other parts 
of the world, why continue with such descriptions of LAP 
as those provided at the onset of this paper? How might 
those other texts, the ones that are often emphasized when 
explaining what LAP is or why this area makes worthwhile 
contributions to academic philosophy in the United States, 
be the real difference makers, so to speak? How does this 
point to that which distinguishes LAP from “mainstream” 
understandings of philosophy?
To say that colonialism ought to be a starting point for 
Latin American philosophy is where controversy starts. 
It is problematic, I admit, to think of colonization as an 
indispensable basis for Latin American philosophy (and 
note that I am aware of the totalizing nature of my claim). 
First off, as Gracia explained above, not all Latin Americans 
have suffered colonialism equally. Here, however, I think 
there is a tendency to think about the experience of 
colonization strictly from the perspective of the victim. I 
offer as example the way whiteness has been understood 
in the context of the United States for support.
It is often the case that white people report that the 
experience of race does not play a central role in their 
life. Being part of the dominant racial group, race is not an 
issue for whites the way it is for Blacks, Hispanics, Native 
Americans, or Asians. Nonetheless, is this to say that white 
identity is race-less? Is this to assume that whiteness has 
not been impacted by the existence of race? Of course not; 
the white experience of race—for the most part, since white 
people always want to remind of the fact that nonwhites 
can be racist to whites as well—is best understood as 
constituting the oppressive side of race relations. Self-
effacing white people who claim to be “white-trash” sound 
as ridiculous as me claiming to be “male-trash”; regardless 
of how much I hate it, others will assign to me the privileges 
that come with masculinity. Nevertheless, even if whites 
do not “feel” race, there is a way in which white identity 
is predicated on the existence of nonwhites. Given that 
whiteness has often been associated with rights, privileges, 
and benefits denied to others, whiteness operates more in 
antagonistic ways. While we may not be able to positively 
identify what whiteness is, we can, and historians often do, 
These examples illustrate the fact that to be Latino 
does not entail much that is generally associated 
with the stereotype. But why should this lumping 
and homogenization generate fear in the Latino 
population? Why do we find strident voices 
complaining and warning about this phenomenon? 
Because we worry that by being lumped together 
into one stereotyped group, the reality which we 
are will be misunderstood—we will be taken as 
what we are not and this can affect our lives in 
significant ways, some very nefarious to our well 
being. Homogenization becomes particularly 
dangerous in political contexts because the 
government often formulates and implements 
social policy based on stereotypes.14
Again, the problem with stereotypes is that they impose 
an image of what it means to be from a particular group 
before individuals have a chance to define themselves. 
Stereotypes limit how our reality will be understood. While 
Gracia may fall back on the claim that there is no normative 
dimension to his argument for the familial-historical view, 
meaning that he is simply painting a more accurate picture 
of reality, the moral dimensions of his train of thought are 
visible in the above passage (i.e., “nefarious to our well 
being”).
Gracia’s comments are reminiscent of what the philosopher 
of liberation, Enrique Dussel, writes while speaking about 
the victim of colonization:
Distant thinkers, those who had a perspective of 
the center from the periphery, those who had to 
define themselves in the presence of an already 
established image of the human person and in 
the presence of uncivilized fellow humans, the 
newcomers, the ones who hope because they are 
always outside, these are the ones who a have 
clear mind for pondering reality.15
“Distant thinkers” are those residing on “the outside” of 
hegemonic circles and totalizing systems; those in colonial 
peripheries in relation to a center that is Europe; those 
for whom their status as a rational subject implies spatial 
connotations, i.e., an aperture or distance from the imposing 
views of the center; those who had images of humanity’s 
past cast upon them in terms of being considered 
barbarian, pre-modern, savage, inferior. “Newcomers,” or 
those for whom creative interpretive practices are possible, 
are best suited to ponder reality since, as Dussel continues, 
they do not seek to defend any privileges or ideological 
perspective.
For Gracia, the lack of necessary and sufficient conditions 
does not rob ethnic philosophies or ethnic groups of an 
identity. Like proper names or dates of birth, there is a 
sense in which ethnic philosophies have specific points of 
origin or arise from a set of circumstances that is unique 
to that grouping (this uniqueness does not entail that the 
traits in question will not be shared by others). However, 
one cannot think of that identity as anything other than 
contingent and contextual. Although Latin American 
philosophy may have a starting point, say the “discovery” 
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cannot be creativity, an aesthetical, epistemological, 
existential, and even political category (remember what José 
Martí says in Nuestra América: “Gobernante, en un pueblo 
nuevo, quiere decir creador”).
Philosophy has always been “creative,” i.e., connected 
to freedom from oppression and striving for a kind of 
openness or responsiveness to life. As Ellacuría wrote in 
“The Liberating Function of Philosophy,”
We can say that philosophy has always had to do 
with freedom, though in different ways. It has 
been assumed that philosophy is that task of free 
individuals and free peoples, free at least of the 
basic needs that can suppress the kind of thinking 
we call philosophy. We also acknowledge that it has 
a liberating function for those who philosophize 
and that as the supreme exercise of reason, it has 
liberated people from obscurantism, ignorance, 
and falsehood. Throughout the centuries, from 
the pre-Socratics to the Enlightenment, through 
all methods of critical thinking, we have ascribed 
a great superiority to reason, and to philosophical 
reason in particular, as a result of its liberating 
function.
[. . .]
This matter of philosophy and freedom gets to the 
fundamental purpose of philosophical knowledge, 
which even if it is understood as a search for truth, 
cannot be reduced to being a search for truth for 
its own sake.21
In almost a prophetic sense, to think of Latin American 
philosophy as “philosophy born of colonial struggle” 
returns philosophy to its original purpose. Whether it 
is from ignorance, misuses of reason, political force, or 
popular dogma, a liberatory dimension has always been 
part of philosophy.
For Ellacuría, the beauty that is philosophical thought 
renders this liberatory tendency explicit when it serves as 
the mouthpiece for a community’s concerns, interests, and 
means of critical and creative self-understanding. Critical 
and creative thought necessitates engaging the full range 
of humanity, not just the elite. Philosophers may be the 
voice of the community, but they are not a revolutionary 
vanguard. Part of the philosopher’s epistemological tool 
kit is the greater portions of society (in Latin America), 
the poor, dominated, and oppressed. Philosophers fail to 
formulate complete conceptions of truth, beauty, meaning, 
and value when the oppressed, poor, and marginalized are 
ignored as sources for knowledge.
That being said, for one to grow up amidst colonial 
oppression, experience it, or perhaps even benefit by 
it, and yet not think philosophically about it takes a 
tremendous amount of effort. To not write about it means 
that one is an “ideologue,” which implies a denier life. It 
is difficult, if not impossible, to think philosophically as a 
Latin American and not be concerned with colonization or 
a derivative subtopic in some way. To not do so requires 
identify the way in which whiteness is a social, political, 
and legal construct that was used to exclude Asians, African 
Americans, and now Hispanics.16
In short, one’s experience of race, or colonization for that 
matter, does not have to begin as victim. This is pertinent 
to my goals in this essay since it sets up the stronger claim: 
Latin American philosophers ought to think of themselves 
as concerned with “philosophers for freedom.”17 I hold this 
view to such an extent that the absence of colonialism or 
liberation-themes from their work can be interpreted as 
a stance on colonization, especially when injustices and 
inequality is ubiquitous in their immediate surroundings 
(the culpability and definitiveness of silence). We can 
take the absence of explicit engagement with the idea of 
coloniality as the basis for one’s opinion on this topic: they 
do not really care about it or represent such a privileged 
approach to philosophy such that they cannot really be 
considered part of the Latin American tradition.18
This stronger claim is partially supported by Ignacio 
Ellacuría’s (the Jesuit philosopher murdered during the 
Salvadorian civil war) views on the liberating aspects of 
philosophy and his normative suggestion that philosophers 
ought to concern themselves with the socio-historical 
contexts they inhabit.19 Crucial to Ellacuría’s views on 
philosophy are both a critical and creative components.20
Since it plays a role in supporting political and socio-
economic institutions, one of the natural targets of 
philosophical critique has always been ideology. Being the 
means through which humans sustain themselves, socio-
economic and political institutions are literally shaping 
human reality by structuring and determining the lives 
and communities of those they serve. Even though it may 
be inherently neutral, ideology, an outgrowth of existing 
institutions, affixes itself to the prevailing understanding of 
reality and reinforces the status quo. In doing so, ideology 
assists in the stifling of growth, thereby denying the 
community the possibility of life. If human communities 
are composed of living beings, their interests and concerns 
cannot be captured by a single economic or political 
structure backed by an ideological outlook that justifies 
itself. That would be to say that all human problems, 
concerns, and creative outputs have reached their zenith, 
something obviously untrue if we are speaking about living 
beings. Philosophy and philosophers fail to represent 
the dynamic entity that is the community when they are 
not sufficiently critical of ideology. Philosophers are 
those individuals that ought to concern themselves with 
this stagnation of life else they deny the conditions that 
engender ensuing philosophical thought. For Ellacuría, the 
fact that Latin American cultures lack a philosophy of their 
own reflects part of the reason why the region remains in 
the grips of inequality and violence.
Yet, never is this criticizing done for no other sake besides 
questioning the status quo; an implicit goal of philosophy has 
always been to bring about change, to improve the situation 
at hand, or at the very least assist in making alternatives to 
the status quo imaginable (and thus possible). Philosophy 
does this by making clear the foundations, or lack thereof, 
of ideology. For Ellacuría, without sufficient critique, there 
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7. Coloniality is not necessarily the rule of a particular colonial 
order or regime, like that of Spain in Mexico or Peru, but is 
the power dynamic implicit to colonial systems resulting in 
stratified social hierarchies divided in terms of class, land rights, 
race, gender, political power, education, and even knowledge-
proprietor or that known. There are thus ontological, historical, 
and epistemological dimensions to coloniality. Although national 
liberation may take place, and thus a society may be “post-
colonial,” there is a sense in which the power dynamics implicit 
to colonization (i.e., coloniality) may still be operational. Aníbal 
Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America,” 
Nepantla: Views from the South 1, no. 3 (2000).
8. Jorge J. E. Gracia, “Ethnic Labels and Philosophy,” Latin American 
Philosophy: Currents, Issues, Debates, Eduardo Mendieta, ed. 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2003), 63.
9. Ibid.
10. See also Gracia, Hispanic/Latino Identity (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers Inc., 2000), 48; Gracia, Surviving Race, Ethnicity, and 
Nationality (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 49–55; and Gracia, 
Latinos in America: Philosophy and Social Identity (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2008).
11. Gracia, “Ethnic Labels and Philosophy,” 58.
12. Ibid.
13. Compare Gracia’s thoughts on history of those of Enrique Dussel 
in his recent political philosophy and ethics. Dussel begins his 
three-volume work on political philosophy with the first volume a 
rethinking of the history of political thought. Rather than start with 
the Greeks, Dussel ventures back farther to reveal the sources for 
the Greek terms for “justice,” “demos,” “equality,” and “destiny.” 
See Enrique Dussel, Politics of Liberation: A Critical World History, 
trans. Thia Cooper (London: SCM Press: 2011 [2007]), 15-16. His 
ethics does the same. The point of comparison with Gracia is that 
where multiple ways of viewing the past lead to a variety of ways 
of thinking about the present and future. Novel justice claims or 
ethical ideas do not come from nowhere; they have a history.
14. Gracia, Latinos in America, xi-xii. Emphasis added.
15. Ibid., 4. Emphasis added.
16. See Ian Haney López, White By Law: The Legal Construction of 
Race (New York: NYU Press, 2006 [1996]).
17. At this point, some may worry that I am creating a scenario where 
I undermine the dynamic nature of Latin American philosophy. 
Risieri Frondizi articulated such a concern in his famous essay 
“Is There an Ibero-American Philosophy?” Phenomenology and 
Philosophical Research Vol. IX, no. 3 (1949). As Frondizi explains, 
philosophers who attempt to think from the perspective of a 
Latin American “corrupt” (my word) the philosophical process. 
By trying to be Latin America or think as a Latin American, one 
runs the risk of self-consciously limiting the creative process 
and perhaps even obviates the possibility for an authentic LAP 
(351–53). The conscious attempt to think in Latin American ways, 
whatever that may be, is a self-imposed handicap that might 
result in the abandonment or dismissal of many ideas that fit the 
Latin American script. Much like being “cool,” one just is; trying 
to be “cool” is not cool. I do not see this as much of a problem 
as I do further proof of the importance of unbridled creativity (or 
freedom) in LAP.
18. The following comments are inspired by Charles Mills’s 
discussion of racial justice and racism in the work of John Rawls. 
See Charles Mills, “Rawls on Race/Race in Rawls,” The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy XLVII (2009): 161–82.
19. Ignacio Ellacuría, “The Liberating Function of Philosophy (1985),” 
in Essays on History, Liberation, and Salvation,” Michael E. Lee, 
ed. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2013), 93–119.
20. Ellacuría, “The Liberating Function of Philosophy,” 96–107.
21. Ibid., 93–119.
conscious effort and willful ignorance, the type of which 
ought to be morally culpable. For those that worry that this 
normative standard leaves out many of Latin America’s 
best thinkers, I think there is a way in which we can keep 
those who do not write on colonialism in the LAP canon: We 
should interpret their silence on this topic as indicative of 
their stance on this issue. Namely, it is an issue not worth 
their attention. Their lack of concern or attention renders 
them complicit with the ideology that supports the status 
quo, which on the one hand stagnates the dynamism that 
is the human community. In the context of Latin America, 
to leave ideology intact is to turn one’s head to social 
and political institutions responsible for the deaths of the 
poor, oppressed, nonwhite (or insufficiently mestizo/a and 
mulatto/a) masses.
What is the nature of philosophy for those who are 
existentially compelled to philosophize? Philosophy, for 
those in this predicament, is not a choice. It is a vocation; 
the pursuit of freedom imposed by the non-freedom 
one lives; a duty brought on by a reality that denies the 
humanity of people. This is what Latin American philosophy 
as a philosophy born of colonial struggle means, and that is 
how I think about Latin American philosophy as a tradition 
that exceeds the history of philosophy south of the U.S. 
border.
NOTES
1. See the comments made by Manuel Vargas in “Multicultural 
Philosophy Panel 2: Comparative Philosophy” (https://vimeo.
com/58932466, accessed July 1, 2015).
2. For a brief discussion of the difference between these 
characterizations (one that also explains how they are compatible 
and not antagonistic), see Susana Nuccetelli, Ofelia Schutte, and 
Otávio Bueno, “Introduction” in A Companion to Latin American 
Philosophy (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007), 1-2. See also 
Nuccetelli, “Latin American Philosophy,” A Companion to Latin 
American Philosophy (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007), 343–57.
3. When Latin American philosophy is understood as simply the 
history of philosophy in Latin America or “philosophy south of the 
U.S. border,” any philosopher in Latin America or with a Hispanic 
surname becomes a Latin American philosopher. I worry about 
this when it comes to job prospects for those who work in this 
area. I think this subfield requires more specialization rather than 
just inclusion for the sake of adding numbers. I thank Kim Diáz 
for reminding me of Tommy Curry’s comments in this regard. 
Perhaps all this paper calls for is more specialization.
4. See Leonard Harris (ed.), Philosophy Born of Struggle (Dubuque, 
IO: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1983). Only the historical 
specificity of the struggle against coloniality as it has taken place 
in Latin America can differentiate Latin American philosophy 
from say African, Asian, and more. I am aware that colonization 
does not happen in any uniform or monolithic way; hence, my 
desire to talk about “philosophy born of colonial struggle” in a 
general sense.
5. The qualifier that runs throughout this sentence implicitly 
acknowledges that not all who come from colonial circumstances 
represent an oppressed or victimized perspective. Thus, there 
are many from Latin American metropolises that represent elite 
points of view and philosophize from freedom. As I explore 
below, especially in my discussion of Ignacio Ellacuría’s views 
on the nature of philosophy, all academic or professional 
philosophers think from freedom. Some philosophers, however, 
are more interested in living an understanding of philosophy that 
places it at the service of various social, political, and economic 
pursuits.
6. Along these lines, see the contributions by Ofelia Schutte and 
Jorge J. E. Gracia to George Yancy’s Reframing the Practice of 
Philosophy: Bodies of Color, Bodies of Knowledge (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 2012).
